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Abstract
It has often been remarked that Bohr’s writings on the interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics make scant reference to the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory; and it has not infrequently been sug-
gested that this is another symptom of the general vagueness, obscu-
rity and perhaps even incoherence of Bohr’s ideas. Recent years have
seen a reappreciation of Bohr, however. In this article we broadly fol-
low this “rehabilitation program”. We offer what we think is a simple
and coherent reading of Bohr’s statements about the interpretation of
quantum mechanics, basing ourselves on primary sources and making
use of—and filling lacunas in—recent secondary literature. We argue
that Bohr’s views on quantum mechanics are more firmly connected
to the structure of the quantum formalism than usually acknowledged,
even though Bohr’s explicit use of this formalism remains on a rather
global and qualitative level. In our reading, Bohr’s pronouncements
on the meaning of quantum mechanics should first of all be seen as re-
sponses to concrete physical problems, rather than as expressions of a
preconceived philosophical doctrine. In our final section we attempt a
more detailed comparison with the formalism and conclude that Bohr’s
interpretation is not far removed from present-day non-collapse inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
Bohr’s writings on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, from his 1927
Como lecture to his articles from the 1950s, are conspicuous by the absence
of detailed discussions of technical aspects of the quantum formalism. In this
respect they are very different from the tradition of foundational work that
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has started in the early 1950s, with Bohm’s hidden-variables scheme, and
has led via Bell’s theorem and similar results to present-day work on quan-
tum information theory. The predominantly qualitative character of Bohr’s
arguments, together with his convoluted and sometimes confusing style, can
easily create the impression of a rhetoric without substantial support in
quantum mechanics itself, aimed at intimidating the reader (Cushing 1994;
Beller 1999). That this impression is superficial and misconceives Bohr’s
perspective on the interpretation of quantum theory has recently been ar-
gued from various sides (Howard 1994, 2004, 2005; Faye 2014; Landsman
2006, 2007; Camilleri and Schlosshauer 2015; Zinkernagel 2015, 2016). The
present essay is an attempt to further contribute to this program of reha-
bilitation, without losing sight of possible weaknesses or open questions in
Bohr’s interpretation. We shall argue that the non-technical nature of Bohr’s
writing should not be misconstrued: Bohr’s views are more intimately con-
nected to the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics than usually
acknowledged and reflect salient features of it. In fact, Bohr’s interpretation
bears affinity to modern non-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics.
The idea that Bohr’s statements about the meaning of quantum mechan-
ics have a direct link to the structure of the mathematical formalism may
at first sight seem implausible. After all, Bohr himself appears to downplay
the significance of this formalism: from the Como lecture to his latest writ-
ings Bohr emphasizes the merely “symbolic” character of the mathematical
apparatus that is used in the new theory. This, together with the notorious
fact that classically describable measuring devices and measurement out-
comes play a central role in Bohr’s interpretation, may suggest that he saw
the formalism as possessing only pragmatic value, as a tool for making pre-
dictions on the macroscopic level. This would imply that Bohr championed
instrumentalism, perhaps even denying the existence of a quantum world at
all—a position that has indeed not infrequently been ascribed to Bohr and
used as a reductio of his views by some anti-Copenhagenists (Cushing 1994;
Beller 1999, cf. Faye 2014).
Recent scholarship has questioned this attribution of instrumentalism to
Bohr (Folse 1985; Howard 1994; Camilleri and Schlosshauer 2015; Zinker-
nagel 2015, 2016)—a line that we shall follow and elaborate. To start with,
we need to take a closer look at Bohr’s reasons for calling the formalism of
quantum mechanics “symbolic”. After this, we shall pay attention to the
role of classical concepts, which in turn will lead us to complementarity and
measurement. We conclude with a discussion of how Bohr’s views compare
to the mathematical formalism, from a modern point of view.
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2 The symbolic character of the quantum formal-
ism
Already in the first section of his famous 1927 Como lecture Bohr typi-
fies quantum mechanics as a “symbolic method” (Bohr 1928). Character-
istically, to argue his point he does not start from the newly developed
Schro¨dinger wave mechanics or Heisenberg matrix mechanics, but discusses
the older, simpler and more qualitative ideas of de Broglie (though it should
not go unnoticed that in section 5 of the Como lecture Bohr makes it clear
that he considers de Broglie’s conceptions as having been embedded and
generalized in the new wave mechanics). De Broglie had proposed to asso-
ciate waves with particles: if E denotes the energy and p the momentum
of a particle, de Broglie postulates an associated wave with frequency ν
and wavelength λ satisfying the relations E/ν = pλ = h (with h Planck’s
constant). Bohr now observes that according to these relations the phase
velocity of the wave associated with a particle moving at speed v is given
by c2/v, whereas the group velocity is equal to v. He comments: “The cir-
cumstance that [the phase velocity] is in general greater than the velocity
of light emphasizes the symbolic character of these considerations. At the
same time, the possibility of identifying the velocity of the particle with the
group-velocity indicates the field of application of space-time pictures in the
quantum theory.”
The contrast that Bohr notes here gives us a first clue about the criteria
he has in mind when he qualifies the formalism as “symbolic”. It is clear
that a wave propagating with superluminal velocity cannot correspond to
something physically real propagating in space—this wave must therefore be
symbolic in the uncontroversial sense of being not physical but rather having
the status of a mathematical tool coming from Fourier analysis. On the other
hand, a packet of such mathematical waves, propagating with group velocity
v, apparently can be thought of as representing something physically real
(taking into account caveats and restrictions to be discussed!). Elaborating
on the latter point, Bohr goes on to discuss the spreads (dispersions) in
energy and momentum inherent in de Broglie wave packets and concludes
that these determine “the highest possible accuracy in the definition of the
energy and momentum of the individuals associated with the wave-field”.
We shall soon return to the meaning of this “accuracy in definition”; but
an immediate and obvious conclusion to be drawn is that according to Bohr
we are allowed to think of physical “individuals” associated with packets of
de Broglie waves. Indeed, the Como Lecture is quite explicit that the wave
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packets correspond to atomic and subatomic entities, like electrons. The
notion that the lecture is meant to promulgate an instrumentalist interpre-
tation of quantum theory according to which the whole formalism possesses
only mathematical and no physical descriptive content is thus immediately
seen to sit uneasily with the textual evidence.
It is true that Bohr immediately follows up his mention of quantum indi-
viduals with the warning that the applicability of familiar classical concepts
to them is severely limited, in view of the “inaccuracy in definition” just
mentioned. Energy and momentum, and also position as characterized by
a wave packet, cannot possess sharp values. As Bohr tells us, a corollary of
this is that classical mechanics can at most have restricted validity. Only
in limiting situations, comparable to the limit in which geometrical optics
can replace wave optics, is it to be expected that we can recover a picture
in which energy and momentum are well-defined in combination with sharp
positions (sharp positions at each instant of time lead to “a well-defined
space-time picture” in Bohr’s terminology). Arguing from the simple exam-
ple of a single particle, formally represented by a de Broglie wave packet,
Bohr at this point already formulates the thesis that well-defined space-time
pictures and “the claims of causality” (i.e. the instantiation of well-defined
values of energy and momentum fulfilling conservation laws), are not com-
patible in the description of quantum individuals. As he says,
the content of the relations (2) [i.e. the qualitative uncertainty
relations 4t4E = 4q4p = h derived from a Fourier analysis of
wave packets] may be summarised in the statement that accord-
ing to the quantum theory a general reciprocal relation exists
between the maximum sharpness of definition of the space-time
and energy-momentum vectors associated with the individuals.
... At the same time, however, the general character of this rela-
tion makes it possible to a certain extent to reconcile the conser-
vation laws with the space-time coordination of observations, the
idea of a coincidence of well-defined events in a space-time point
being replaced by that of unsharply defined individuals within
finite space-time regions (Bohr 1928, sec. 2).
This first discussion of the symbolic character of the quantum formalism
at the very start of the Como lecture is illuminating and already clarifies
several issues. Importantly, that the formalism is symbolic is apparently not
meant to imply that the formalism remains completely silent about physical
entities on the micro level or even denies their existence. Quite the oppo-
site, Bohr explicitly tells us that the theory is about physical individuals
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like electrons and photons. But, second and certainly not less important,
these “things” should not be thought of as objects describable with values
of physical quantities like energy, momentum and position in the way we
would expect on the basis of classical mechanics. In classical mechanics par-
ticles necessarily possess well-defined positions, momenta and energies at all
instants—but for quantum individuals the attribution of both sharp space-
time positions and sharp energy/momentum values is inconsistent with the
formalism (namely the mathematical properties of wave packets, which can
be carried over to the Schro¨dinger theory), says Bohr. These two groups of
concepts (dynamical versus space-time concepts) are incompatible (in fact,
“complementary”, as to be discussed more extensively in a moment) and
their applicability is reciprocally restricted by the uncertainty relations. At
the same time, it is possible to think of individuals with “unsharply defined
momentum/energy and space-time locations”; and in situations in which
Planck’s constant h can be considered insignificantly small this gives us an
approximation to the classical picture. However, in general the incompati-
bility of p and q stands in the way of a vizualizable picture of the kind we
are used to in classical mechanics and in everyday experience.1
So it turns out that the “symbolic character” of the formalism refers
first and foremost to the notion that familiar looking mathematical quanti-
ties like p and q do not stand for the well-defined physical properties that
we would expect them to represent—the relation between the mathemati-
cal formalism and the quantum world must consequently be more indirect
than in classical mechanics. It does not follow from this that the quan-
tum formalism deals only with macroscopic measurement outcomes and has
nothing to say about features of the quantum world. Quite the opposite,
Bohr clearly takes the symbolism to yield information about what we can
say about quantum individuals like atoms, photons and electrons. In fact,
it is the formalism that shows us that such “particles” cannot be pictorially
represented in the way of classical physics.
This reading of the meaning of “symbolic” is supported by the remainder
of the Como lecture. Bohr briefly discusses matrix mechanics, and observes
that p and q in this formulation of quantum mechanics are not numbers,
but rather non-commuting matrices obeying the canonical commutation re-
1At the end of the Como lecture Bohr puts this in the perspective of science leading
us ever further away from everyday intuitions: although we make contact with the world
through “ordinary perception”, to which each and every word in our language is tailored,
we have to adapt our theoretical interpretations of these perceptions to “our gradually
deepening knowledge of the laws of Nature”. Bohr adds that this same point should
already have become evident from Einstein’s theory of relativity.
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lation. As he says, “this exchange relation [i.e. the commutation relation]
expresses strikingly the symbolic character of the matrix formulation of the
quantum theory.” The point is that matrices are operators and not numer-
ical quantities, and therefore cannot directly represent values of physical
quantities.
Bohr then turns to wave mechanics, of which Schro¨dinger had hoped
that it would restore visualizability to atomic physics: Schro¨dinger aimed
to relate his Ψ to physical waves existing in three-dimensional space. Bohr
rejects this possibility of a vizualizable depiction and asserts that “wave
mechanics just as the matrix theory ... represents a symbolic transcription
of the problem of motion of classical mechanics adapted to the requirements
of quantum theory” (Bohr 1928, sec. 5); and “in the wave equation, time
and space as well as energy and momentum are utilised in a purely formal
way.”
Bohr explains that he has three grounds for the latter claim. First,
the Schro¨dinger theory represents momentum by a differential operator p =
ih¯∂/∂q, in which the imaginary quantity i occurs. Second, “there can be no
question of an immediate connexion with our ordinary conceptions because
the ‘geometrical’ problem represented by the wave equation is associated
with the so-called co-ordinate space, the number of dimensions of which is
equal to the number of degrees of freedom of the system, and hence in general
greater than the number of dimensions of the ordinary space.” Third, Bohr
notes that “Schro¨dinger’s formulation of the interaction problem, just as the
formulation offered by matrix theory, involves a neglect of the finite velocity
of propagation of the forces claimed by relativity theory.”
This third reason is rather surprising, as it belongs to another category
of objections than the other two. The non-relativistic character of 1927
quantum mechanics certainly signifies that this version of the theory cannot
be completely correct—it will need a relativistic generalization. But this
in itself is not relevant for visualizability or for whether the mathematical
quantities in the formalism could be potential descriptors of physical real-
ity; classical mechanics has also been superseded by relativity, but this does
not make the formalism of classical mechanics automatically “symbolic” in
a philosophically interesting sense. One can of course say that the basic
incorrectness of non-relativistic quantum mechanics implies that the world
is different from what a literal reading of the formalism would suggest. Still,
the other two arguments are conceptually different, and more interesting,
because they bear on the representational capacity in principle of the math-
ematical symbols to capture elements of physical reality, and not on the
predictive correctness of the theory.
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That the three arguments are here lumped together as if they were of
the same sort appears to betray a certain lack of philosophical finesse on
Bohr’s part, or a lack of interest in matters of this kind—it is indicative
of a physicist’s rather than a philosopher’s attitude. In the practice of
physics research it is quite common not to be too “nitpicking” about small
conceptual differences of this sort. And then, of course, the Como lecture
was meant for a physics audience—its text is full of detailed examples from
contemporary experimental practice and theoretical explanations offered by
colleague physicists. This accords with the general point that Bohr is here
concerned, as a physicist, with questions about the validity, applicability,
consistency and content of the new physical theory. It would accordingly
be a distortion to see Bohr’s views as basically stemming from an a priori
philosophical background: assumptions of physical common sense plus the
abstract reasoning typical of theoretical physics suffice to understand his
reasoning in the Como lecture and later writings.
The argument that imaginary quantities occur in the theory and that for
this reason the theory must be considered symbolic appears as rather unso-
phisticated from a philosophical viewpoint as well, since imaginary numbers
can be used very well to represent physically real quantities. Of course,
one should not come under the spell of the everyday language meaning of
“imaginary” and confuse it with the mathematical significance of the term;
one should not suppose that i =
√−1 cannot represent anything physically
existing because of this connotation. Apart from the trivial point that it
is a matter of conventional choice of scale whether measurement results are
expressed in real or imaginary numbers, there is the practical example of
physically real vector quantities that can be handled very conveniently with
complex numbers, as is standard practice in classical electrodynamics.2
Nevertheless, in the case before us sense can perhaps be made of Bohr’s
conclusion. Indeed, suppose we have defined a scale for physical position q in
the usual way, i.e. by means of real numbers. Then the relation p = ih¯∂/∂q
seems to indicate that real values for q cannot go together with real values
for p, assuming that the function that is being differentiated is real-valued.
This would entail that p and q cannot be jointly defined and measured on
the same type of number scale—something very strange from the viewpoint
2The remark that the occurrence of the imaginary number i signals the symbolic nature
of a formalism appears without further explanation passim in Bohr’s publications. It
seems therefore not completely impossible that Bohr did fall prey to a confusion between
the technical mathematical and the intuitive meaning of “imaginary”—if so, this would
reinforce the comment that not too much subtle philosophizing should be imputed to
Bohr.
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of classical physics and impossible to visualize. If on the other hand the wave
function that is differentiated has an imaginary value itself (as is actually
common in quantum mechanics), this wave is apparently of a completely
different dimension than the physical quantity q, which is also impossible to
incorporate into a classical picture. So the occurrence of i =
√−1 may in the
present context be associated with the incompatibility of physical quantities.
The symbols representing these quantities in the formalism must therefore
be symbolical in the same sense as before, namely as defying vizualizability
and literal interpretation.
Bohr himself tells us that his second argument, about the dimensionality
of configuration space, is the most important one: “above all there can be
no question of an immediate connexion with our ordinary conceptions be-
cause...the wave equation is associated with the so-called co-ordinate space.”
Indeed, this argument seems clear and illustrative of what Bohr is aiming at.
The Schro¨dinger wave in the case of a many-particle system is not a physical
wave in three-dimensional space (which would be an “ordinary conception”)
but “lives” in a high-dimensional mathematical space, so it is “symbolical”
in the sense we discussed.
This argument does not entail that the wave function cannot contain in-
formation about the micro world: the description of a many-particles system
(like a gas) by means of one point in phase space, in classical statistical me-
chanics, also uses many more than three dimensions, but is still in one-to-one
correspondence with the ordinary description of several particles in three-
space. So we should not mistake this argument for the symbolic character
of the wave function for an argument in favor of instrumentalism.
In fact, the analogy with classical statistical mechanics shows that Bohr’s
argument is more complicated than it first appears. The argument only
acquires cogency when we take into account that the situation in quantum
mechanics is fundamentally different from the one in classical statistical
mechanics: a quantum many-particles wave in configuration space cannot
in general be decomposed into many single-particle three-dimensional waves,
whereas a classical phase point in a high-dimensional phase space can be
understood in terms of ordinary three-dimensional descriptions of individual
particles. This difference is due to the possibility of superposing quantum
waves in configuration space: the sum of any two waves is again a bona
fide Schro¨dinger wave. Even if the two original waves were decomposable
as a product of one-particle waves, the superposed wave would not be. This
relates directly to the typical quantum feature of entanglement and the
corresponding holistic character of the quantum description of many-body
systems. Bohr does not mention the point in this form (entanglement), but
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we have to assume that the superposition principle was in the back of his
mind when he argued about the symbolic character of the description in
configuration space.
Essentially the same arguments as used in the Como lecture can be found
in Bohr’s later work (although, perhaps significantly, the argument about
the non-relativistic character of the theory disappears). In his famous “Dis-
cussion with Einstein on epistemological problems in atomic physics” Bohr
explicitly connects the symbolic character of the quantum formalism to its
non-vizualizability when he speaks of “the use of not directly visualizable
symbolism” (Bohr 1949, 238), and he extensively comments on the difficulty
of thinking of quantum objects in terms of conventional physical attributes.3
In his brief 1948 Dialectica article in which he summarizes his position we
again read: “These symbols [viz. p and q] themselves, as is indicated already
by the use of imaginary numbers, are not susceptible to pictorial interpreta-
tion” (Bohr 1948, 314). In the same article Bohr freely speaks about atomic
objects, electrons and photons; while emphasizing again the novel quantum
problem of describing them in terms of the usual physical quantities.
We may conclude that Bohr’s emphasis on the symbolic nature of the
quantum formalism is intended to warn us against a literal classical inter-
pretation with respect to the meaning of mathematical quantities like p and
q. The quantum world should accordingly not be thought of as directly
mirrored by the mathematical formalism: micro properties cannot be read
off from the mathematical symbols in the manner they can in classical me-
chanics. Moreover, Bohr argues that the problems that we encounter when
we try to construct such a classical picture, while staying in conformity with
quantum mechanics, are not of a pragmatic nature: they constitute prob-
lems of principle. The very structure of the quantum formalism precludes
its classical interpretation.
The arguments that Bohr adduces for non-vizualizability and the sym-
bolic nature of the formalism therefore by the same token show that the
structure of the quantum formalism provides us with information about
features of the quantum world. For example, we saw that the spreads of
wave packets according to Bohr indicate to what extent a space-time pic-
ture and/or a causal description are applicable, and therefore to what extent
such descriptions are able to latch on to the physical world. Directly related
to this, the canonical commutation relations in the mathematical formalism
3Thereby recognizing the existence of quantum objects, even if not characterizable
in a detached and non-contextual way; note also that Bohr talks about “not directly
visualizable formalism” (emphasis added), leaving it open that indirect ways of endowing
the symbols with physical content may be possible.
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tell us that sharp values of position and momentum cannot co-exist, and so
inform us about a characteristic feature of the quantum world.
3 The indispensability of classical concepts
The symbolic character of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechan-
ics in the sense just explained implies that we cannot rely on the usual
physical interpretation of mathematical symbols like p and q. This raises
the question of how we can interpret the formalism at all. The dilemma is
that to endow the symbols with physical meaning we seem to need knowl-
edge about what the quantum world is like, what kind of things are “out
there”, so that we can make the formalism correspond to these things. But
on the other hand it is quantum mechanics itself that has to provide us with
information about the structure of the quantum world. However, the theory
can only do so after it has made contact with physical reality, when it is an
interpreted physical theory: a purely mathematical scheme cannot tell us
anything about the physical world.
A deceptively similar problem played a major role in early twentieth cen-
tury logical empiricism. The logical empiricists attempted to make it clear
how purely mathematical calculi could be interpreted empirically, without
the intrusion of metaphysical elements. They proposed to solve this prob-
lem via the postulation of “correspondence rules” (Carnap) or “coordinative
definitions” (Reichenbach); the idea simply being that we need an already
empirically interpreted and stable vocabulary through which symbols in the
as yet uninterpreted theory can be infused with physical meaning. Given
that it is essential for this logical empiricist enterprise to stay as close as pos-
sible to theoretically uninfected experience, it is an obvious choice to take an
observation language with a minimum of theoretical baggage for the already
interpreted and stable language. The interpretational basis should thus be
close to our pre-theoretical everyday language and should enable us to un-
ambiguously refer to observable things and the results of experiments (as in
Carnap’s “Ding-Sprache”). The various ways in which this basic idea was
elaborated by the logical empiricists, and the many ensuing debates (verifi-
cationism, cognitive significance, instrumentalism versus realism, etc.), are
well known and need not detain us here.
The short description of the basic idea just given already suffices to
make it understandable why the logical empiricists expected Bohr to be a
close philosophical friend.4 But although part of Bohr’s ideas about the
4In 1936 the 2nd International Congress for the Unity of Science took place in Copen-
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interpretation of the quantum formalism can be seen as a physicist’s ver-
sion of the correspondence rule programme, there are also important differ-
ences. Bohr’s approach was not motivated by a strict empiricism or by an
anti-metaphysical attitude, but by the problems—reviewed in the previous
section—that arise when we wish to give the usual classical interpretation
to symbols like p and q.
Nevertheless, the task Bohr had to face bears a striking resemblance to
the problem of how to give empirical content to an uninterpreted formalism,
as we are also here dealing with a formalism that needs empirical interpre-
tation. Moreover, the sought-for interpretation should obviously make it
possible to adequately describe what is happening in the laboratory. But in
this description of the laboratory world essential differences start to appear
between Bohr and the logical empiricists. Bohr does not strive for a puri-
fied theory-less observation language (and even less for a reliance on sense
data), but simply accepts that the interpreted new theory should be a gen-
eralization of classical physics. The anchor point for this generalization are
the descriptions we already use in experimental practice: in the laboratory
we speak about macroscopic objects and measurement outcomes, but also
about many not directly observable things, like atomic particles, electric
and magnetic fields, electric currents, and so forth. Bohr does not at all
protest against this and does not attempt to suppress or reconstruct this
language. However, as we have seen, he does warn against the supposition
that all aspects of this “classical language” possess unrestricted validity,
and in particular against the uncritical joint attribution of traditional phys-
ical attributes when we refer to micro entities. On the other hand, that
the assignment of classical attributes works eminently well in the case of
macroscopic objects is an unavoidable fact of laboratory life and more than
two centuries of experience with classical physics. Quantum theory must
certainly be able to reproduce this actual state of affairs. This situation
suggests a way for linking the quantum formalism to experience, namely
via our already existing classical description of the macro world. As Bohr
puts it in an often-quoted passage in his contribution to the 1949 Einstein
volume:
It is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena tran-
scend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of
hagen at Bohr’s honorary residence at Carlsberg (Faye 2008). Neurath, Hempel, Popper,
Philipp Frank and other logical empiricist luminaries were in attendance, whereas Re-
ichenbach, Schlick, and Carnap intended to be present but were finally unable to come.
Bohr later complained, however, that the philosophers had not understood his ideas about
complementarity.
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all evidence must be expressed in classical terms. The argument
is simply that by the word “experiment” we refer to a situa-
tion where we can tell others what we have done and what we
have learned and that, therefore, the account of the experimen-
tal arrangement and of the results of the observations must be
expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of
the terminology of classical physics (Bohr 1949, 209).
This passage has been deemed mysterious and has given rise to speculations
about why Bohr thought that classical concepts were essential. Thus, it has
become one of the sources of the belief that Bohr was an instrumentalist or
a strict empiricist. It has also been interpreted as evidence that Bohr was
influenced by Kantianism and saw classicality as an a priori precondition
of the possibility of empirical knowledge; or that he anticipated the more
modern philosophical idea that we are “suspended in language”, in fact
classical language.5
But motivations originating in—or strongly influenced by—philosophical
doctrines need not be assumed here. As is clear from the wording of the
just quoted passage, Bohr himself thought of his claim as simple and ob-
vious. This is in agreement with our view that Bohr took the classicality
of experimental practice (in the sense that classical concepts are adequate
for the description of results and are in fact the only ones we possess to de-
scribe them) as an undisputed and familiar fact. This classical description
is basically just the description in terms of everyday language, generalized
by the addition of physics terminology, and it is the one we de facto use to
describe our environment. Bohr apparently found this observation so self-
evident, almost tautological, that he sometimes called the applicability of
classical concepts to experimental practice a “logical demand”; because, as
he says, “the word ‘experiment’ can in essence only be used in referring to
a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have
learned” (Bohr 1948, 313).
This simple reading of Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts is confirmed,
as we shall see, by the way Bohr further elaborated on the role of these
concepts in his interpretation of quantum mechanics, and also by evidence
coming from explanations that Bohr gave in private conversations. For
example, in discussions with Heisenberg in 1927 Bohr already stated: “in
spite of your uncertainty principle you have got to use words like ‘posi-
tion’ and ‘velocity’ just because you haven’t got anything else”(Camilleri
5Faye (2014) and Howard (1994) present a list of such “philosophical interpretations”
of Bohr.
12
and Schlosshauer 2015); and von Weizsa¨cker tells the anecdote that when
the physicist Edward Teller was expressing doubts about the importance of
classical concepts, at an afternoon tea at Bohr’s Institute, Bohr briefly fell
asleep and awakening merely replied: “Oh, I understand. You might as well
say that we are not sitting here, drinking tea, but that we are just dreaming
all this” (Drieschner 2014, 78).
The use of classical concepts does not involve a wholesale acceptance of
classical physics. As Bohr says in the above quotation, it is the evidence
provided by macroscopic measuring devices (pointer readings, light flashes,
sounds, etc.) that is to be expressed in classical terms, “however far the
phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation”. In other
words, although we need kinematical concepts like p and q on the macro-
scopic level, we have to expect that the classical dynamical laws will fail to
give us adequate explanations of the values that we actually find for these
quantities.
Specifically, we know that macroscopic objects can be ascribed a posi-
tion and a momentum; and Bohr does not hesitate to relate these to the q
and p occurring in the quantum formalism when it is applied to macroscopic
objects. We here again discern the significant difference between Bohr’s con-
cerns, which are primarily physical, and the philosophical concerns of the
logical empiricists. Bohr is not interested in formal rules that determine
the empirical content of terms like “position” and “momentum”, and is not
engaged in a conceptual purification programme a` la Mach. He accepts the
descriptive vocabulary of classical physics as soon as this becomes possible
without contradictions, i.e. on the macroscopic level, and uses this as his
cue to achieve a generalization of classical physics that applies to atomic
objects as well. As we shall see in the next section, this generalization will
be realized not by formal definitions of microscopic attributes in terms of
macroscopic measuring results (as might be expected on a logical empiricist
analysis), but by partly taking over the “metaphysics” of classical physics
while complicating it by adding a relational aspect, namely a dependence
on the experimental context (the famous doctrine of complementarity). The
very first two sentences of section 1 of the Como lecture already announce
this: “The quantum theory is characterised by the acknowledgment of a fun-
damental limitation in the classical physical ideas when applied to atomic
phenomena. The situation thus created is of a peculiar nature, since our in-
terpretation of the experimental material rests essentially upon the classical
concepts” (Bohr 1928, 580).
However, Bohr’s strategy seems to be immediately menaced by the ob-
jection that his own arguments for the symbolic nature of the quantum
13
formalism forbid an identification of the quantum symbols p and q with
the classical concepts of momentum and position, even in the macroscopic
realm. At least, this problem arises if we consider quantum mechanics to
be a universal theory, applicable both at the micro and macro level. Now,
it has often been claimed in the older literature, and is sometimes still said
today, that Bohr assumed that the world consists of two ontologically dif-
ferent parts, on two sides of a dividing line, a “cut”: a quantum world on
the microscopic side of the cut, and a classical world, governed by classical
laws, on the macro side.
But the idea that Bohr denied the universal validity of quantum me-
chanics is mistaken. Indeed, from his earliest writings on Bohr argues from
the assumption that quantum theory is universal, in the sense of applica-
ble to both micro and macro systems (Howard 1994; Landsman 2006, 2007;
Camilleri and Schlosshauer 2015).6 In the Como lecture the universality
of quantum theory is not an explicitly addressed theme, but is implicitly
assumed throughout the text. For example, already in the first section
of the lecture Bohr mentions that observations of atomic systems consist
in physical interactions with “the agencies of observation”, and that these
interactions are to be treated quantum mechanically and, importantly, sym-
metrically so that “an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense [i.e.
the classical sense in which each system has its own independent state] can
neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation”
(Bohr 1928, 580). The lack of independence to which Bohr refers here is a
typical quantum feature that we shall discuss further in the next section;
the important point for our present purposes is that this quantum feature
is ascribed to both parties in a measurement, to the micro system and the
measuring device7.
In his 1935 reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, Bohr is more explicit
in his discussion of macroscopic devices, and employs quantum mechanics
to deal with a macroscopic diaphragm in the experimental set-up that he
proposes as an analogue to the EPR experiment. Interestingly, he mentions
here that it may seem a problem that this implies using quantum mechanics
6Zinkernagel (2015, 2016) has recently defended a more sophisticated version of a
Bohrian ontological “cut”, according to which it is true that each physical system can
be described quantum mechanically, but not all systems can be treated quantum me-
chanically at the same time. We shall come back to this “anti-quantum-fundamentalism”
shortly.
7Moreover, Bohr tells us in the same passage that it is arbitrary how we divide the
total system into a measured and a measuring part. This would make no sense at all if
there were an ontological “cut” between a quantum and a classical realm.
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for “some process to which the ideas of classical mechanics can be applied.”
But, he says, “if all spatial dimensions and time intervals are taken suf-
ficiently large, this involves clearly no limitation as regards the accurate
control of momentum”, and “a purely classical account of the measuring ap-
paratus ... implies the necessity of allowing a latitude corresponding to the
quantum-mechanical uncertainty relations in our description of its behavior”
(Bohr 1935, 698). Bohr implies here that the quantum description remains
ontologically primary, even when we use (as we must) classical concepts to
describe macroscopic objects. The classical description is approximate in
the sense that in principle we should accept that there are “latitudes” in the
classical quantities (like p and q), in accordance with the uncertainty rela-
tions. However, these latitudes will normally play no role in our dealings
with the macroscopic world because they are enormously small (“condi-
tioned by h”) compared to the usual values of macroscopic quantities, and
they will therefore not stand in the way of a classical description. However,
they certainly exist and should be taken into account explicitly (Bohr 1935,
698 second column) when we discuss the consistency of the quantum me-
chanical scheme—implicitly they are always there, even when we use only
classical terms and do not apply the quantum formalism.
Bohr elaborates this point in his Dialectica article and in his contribu-
tion to the Einstein volume (Bohr 1948, 1949). In the latter, in his famous
analysis of experiments in which a particle goes through a hole (or two
holes!) in a diaphragm—prompted by Einstein’s arguments at the 1927
Solvay conference—Bohr comments on the possibility of controlling the mo-
mentum transfer between the particle and the macroscopic diaphragm:
Here, it must be taken into consideration that the position and
the motion of the diaphragm and the shutter have so far been
assumed to be accurately co-ordinated with the space-time ref-
erence frame. This assumption implies, in the description of the
state of these bodies, an essential latitude as to their momentum
and energy which need not, of course, noticeably affect the ve-
locities, if the diaphragm and the shutter are sufficiently heavy
(Bohr 1949, 215).
The essential point to note here is that Bohr mentions the quantum and
classical descriptions of the diaphragm and shutter as jointly applicable.
Moreover, the classical description, in terms of a well-defined velocity, is
clearly conceived of as approximate (the latitude required by quantum the-
ory will not noticeably affect the definite value of the velocity if the bodies
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are macroscopic in the sense of sufficiently heavy). The same sort of remarks
can be found throughout Bohr’s analyses of Einstein’s thought experiments.
It is true that Bohr also says that we should distinguish “between the
objects under investigation and the measuring instruments which serve to
define, in classical terms, the conditions under which the phenomena appear”
(Bohr 1949, 221–222). But he follows this up with the declaration that
all unambiguous use of space-time concepts in the description of
atomic phenomena is confined to the recording of observations
which refer to marks on a photographic plate or to similar practi-
cally irreversible amplification effects like the building of a water
drop around an ion in a cloud-chamber. Although, of course,
the existence of the quantum of action is ultimately responsible
for the properties of the materials of which the measuring instru-
ments are built and on which the functioning of the recording de-
vices depends, this circumstance is not relevant for the problems
of the adequacy and completeness of the quantum-mechanical
description in its aspects here discussed.
This shows that Bohr considered it a matter of course that from an onto-
logical point of view macroscopic objects are basically quantum mechanical.
He also identifies, in the just-quoted passage, what he sees as the conditions
that have to be fulfilled, from the viewpoint of the quantum description, to
make classical concepts applicable: effects must be amplified to the macro-
scopic level and must become practically irreversible. The conclusion must
be that for Bohr the necessity of using classical concepts has a purely epis-
temic status: it has to do with our access to the world, by means of macro-
scopic devices that are described by common language (extended by classical
physics). It certainly does not correspond to any ontological dividing line
between quantum and classical.
This conclusion is decisively supported by Bohr’s Dialectica paper, in
which he summarizes the situation with comparatively great clarity. Bohr
explains:
Incidentally, it may be remarked that the construction and the
functioning of all apparatus like diaphragms and shutters, serv-
ing to define geometry and timing of the experimental arrange-
ments, or photographic plates used for recording the localiza-
tion of atomic objects, will depend on properties of materials
which are themselves essentially determined by the quantum of
action. Still, this circumstance is irrelevant for the study of
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simple atomic phenomena where, in the specification of the ex-
perimental conditions, we may to a very high degree of approx-
imation disregard the molecular constitution of the measuring
instruments. If only the instruments are sufficiently heavy com-
pared with the atomic objects under investigation, we can in
particular neglect the requirements of relation (3) [i.e., the un-
certainty relation] as regards the control of the localization in
space and time of the single pieces of apparatus relative to each
other (Bohr 1948, 315–316).
Once again, it should be noted that Bohr here speaks about approximations,
and neglecting the quantum character of the macroscopic devices. Obviously,
one can only neglect something if it actually exists. It follows that according
to Bohr the classical descriptions of devices must in principle be applicable
at the same time as their quantum descriptions.
A difference between the two descriptions is that our immediate epis-
temic access is restricted to the classical one, and that we therefore need
this classical description to give physical content to the quantum formalism
at all. When we thus use classical language to endow the quantum formulas
with physical content, it turns out that we cannot transfer the usual classical
pictures to the micro world: even when interpreted with the help of classi-
cal concepts, the formalism of quantum mechanics remains non-visualizable
in the general case of latitudes in position and momentum that cannot be
neglected. This is the background of complementarity, to be discussed in
the next section.
We therefore side with Landsman (2006, 2007), who briefly remarks that
the Bohrian privileged status of classical concepts should be considered as
merely epistemic; and also with Camilleri and Schlosshauer (2015) who ar-
gue that there is no conflict between Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts
and the present-day “decoherence research programme” according to which
classical descriptions emerge as very accurate approximations when quan-
tum mechanics is applied to open systems (like the objects of everyday
experience).
Our conclusion also bears affinity to what Howard (1994) proposes, but
there are differences of nuance. Howard argues that Bohr demanded a clas-
sical description only of a part of macroscopic measuring devices, and that
a quantum description would be possible for the remaining properties; and,
second, that the use of classical concepts can be understood from a more
fundamental requirement of “objectivity”. The first thesis suggests (per-
haps unintentionally) that the classical part of a device cannot be given a
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quantum description at the same time; this would be false, as we think to
have demonstrated. It is true, of course, that to give a quantum description
of a device we need the physically interpreted formalism, and therefore some
other part of the world to which we apply classical concepts unrestrictedly.
Howard’s second thesis, about an underlying philosophical requirement
(“objectivity”) that should justify the privileged status of classical concepts,
in our opinion imputes too much in the way of philosophical motivation
and approach to Bohr. In our portrayal, Bohr should first of all be seen
as a physicist, motivated by concrete physical problems of his days. That
we need classical language is from this viewpoint a simple bare fact, given
the actual physical situation we find ourselves in; it is not something in
need of philosophical justification. According to Bohr the strangeness of the
situation, and what has to be explained, is not that we can apply classical
concepts, but rather that classical descriptions cannot be applied across the
board. Quantum features of the world manifest themselves in the results of
experiments in our laboratories and these results can evidently be described
in classical language. So how can we understand that this basic classicality
does not extend to the micro world, as demonstrated by wave particle duality
(in the Compton effect, for example) and similar phenomena? The task Bohr
saw before him was to incorporate this unmistakable micro non-classicality
into one consistent whole together with the equally undeniable classicality
of our macro descriptions.
According to this analysis Bohr viewed the world as fundamentally quan-
tum mechanical: we live in a quantum world. This contradicts a recent
construal of Bohr’s ideas by Zinkernagel, who argues that Bohr was not a
“quantum fundamentalist”. According to Zinkernagel (2015, 2016), Bohr
held that although all systems can be treated quantum mechanically, they
cannot all be treated this way at the same time.
This in itself is not in conflict with what we said above about the epis-
temic necessity of describing some systems classically in order to have a
pragmatic starting point for the treatment of other systems. But Zinker-
nagel rejects this epistemic interpretation, and puts an ontological spin on
Bohr’s statements. He objects to the idea that Bohr’s requirement of a
classical description of measuring devices is a pragmatic or epistemological
demand and also rejects the view that according to Bohr the device is really
a quantum mechanical system. For example, he writes:
A way to understand Bohr’s requirement is that we need a ref-
erence frame to make sense of, say, the position of an electron
(in order to establish with respect to what an electron has a po-
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sition). And, by definition, a reference frame has a well-defined
position and state of motion (momentum). Thus the reference
frame is not subject to any Heisenberg uncertainty, and it is in
this sense (and in this context) classical. This does not exclude
that any given reference system could itself be treated quan-
tum mechanically, but we would then need another—classically
described—reference system e.g. to ascribe position (or uncer-
tainty in position) to the former. I think Bohr’s view can be
summarized in the claim that any system may in principle be
seen as and treated quantum mechanically, but not all systems
can be seen as and treated in this way simultaneously. This
reading of Bohr’s viewpoint might be called restricted quantum
universalism (Zinkernagel 2015, 430).
But as we have seen in our earlier quotations of Bohr, Bohr does not
maintain that a classical system is not subject to Heisenberg uncertainty;
quite the opposite, Bohr claims that it is essential for consistency that this
uncertainty exists in principle even in macroscopic objects, in the form of
very small latitudes, although it is true that we should necessarily discard
these latitudes in a classical description of the object (in which they make
no sense). That we need another, classically described, system as soon as
we wish to treat a macroscopic object quantum mechanically is true, but as
we have seen this can be given a natural epistemological reading. Zinker-
nagel’s ontological interpretation is therefore not well founded in what Bohr
writes. What is more, the precise ontological content of his proposed “re-
stricted quantum universalism” is obscure. It is completely intelligible that
descriptions of physical systems can be context dependent; this is an epis-
temological point of whose validity we can easily become convinced even
without any appeal to quantum mechanics. But what can it mean to say
that the ontological status of an object is context dependent; that in one
context it is classical, and in another context it is quantum mechanical,
even though these two “modes of being” exclude each other? A systematic
elucidation and elaboration of this idea would require a drastic change in
basic ideas about ontology and it seems implausible to impute such inten-
tions to Bohr, who hardly makes any explicit reference to ontology at all
(whereas epistemological claims abound in his work).
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4 Measurement and complementarity
From the very start of quantum theory it has been a leitmotiv that interac-
tions between quantum systems have to be treated in a way that is different
from what we are used to in classical physics—quantum theory can be said
to have begun with the suggestion that interactions can only take place in
the form of exchanges of finite portions of energy and momentum. This ba-
sic idea can be traced from Planck’s derivation of the black body radiation
law and Einstein’s 1905 light quantum hypothesis, via Bohr’s “old quantum
theory” of 1913, to the research in which Bohr was engaged in the 1920s.
This discreteness of interactions developed in Bohr’s thought from a simple
discontinuity in energy exchanges between well-defined physical systems to
a fundamentally unanalyzable aspect of interactions and then to the notion
that interacting quantum systems are so intertwined with each other that
they form a whole that cannot be thought of as consisting of subsystems
with their own states. As Bohr puts it in his 1948 concise position state-
ment in Dialectica: “a wholly new situation in physical science was created
through the discovery of the universal quantum of action, which revealed
an elementary feature of ‘individuality’ of atomic processes far beyond the
old doctrine of the limited divisibility of matter originally introduced as a
foundation for a causal explanation of the specific properties of material
substances” (Bohr 1948, 313).
It is important to note that Bohr uses the term “individuality” in this
passage (and in many similar ones) in a rather idiosyncratic way: although
it does carry the standard meaning of referring to the individual, own nature
of each single process or situation, the term equally refers to the indivisibility
and the unanalyzable character of the whole (in accordance with the original
meaning of “individuality”). This has not always been understood in the
literature, with the result that some of Bohr’s explanations have seemed
mysterious.
Discreteness in interactions by itself obviously does not necessitate a
renunciation of divisibility or analyzability. One can easily imagine a com-
pletely classical theory in terms of well-defined subsystems in which only
discontinuous and finite energy exchanges occur, and even a classical theory
in which such exchanges can be said to be “uncontrollable” is easy to con-
ceive. To have an example of the latter, one might think of a scheme in which
interactions follow purely probabilistic laws—this sacrifices the deterministic
character of classical physics, but need not conflict with the classical princi-
ple that each of the parties in the interaction possesses its own independent
state. In fact, a theory along precisely these lines was proposed by Bohr,
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Kramers and Slater in 1924. The experimental disproof of this “BKS the-
ory” appears to have played a major role in Bohr’s conclusion that a picture
in which interacting quantum particles each possess their own description
cannot be valid (Howard 2005).8
In the 1927 Como lecture Bohr states this conclusion right at the start as
the very essence of the considerations that are to come: “Notwithstanding
the difficulties which are involved in the formulation of the quantum theory,
it seems, as we shall see, that its essence may be expressed in the so-called
quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential dis-
continuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories
and symbolised by Planck’s quantum of action” (Bohr 1928, 580). It is true
that Bohr’s formulation here (like in other places) is not as transparent
as one would wish; but if one considers it in context and pays attention
to Bohr’s idiosyncratic use of “individuality”, there is no doubt that Bohr
is referring to the holistic nature of interacting systems. Any remaining
hesitation on this point is removed when we read the further explanation
that follows a few lines after the just-given quotation: “Now the quantum
postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena will involve
an interaction with the agency of observation not to be neglected. Accord-
ingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be
ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation” (Bohr 1928,
580)—italics added.9
In this quote the mention of an interaction that should not be neglected
may seem to presuppose separate entities with well-defined states—states
that are subsequently disturbed by the interaction. This is obviously not
intended: the second sentence in the quote denies precisely this existence
of independent states. Indeed, in several places in his writings Bohr warns
us that when he uses phrases like “disturbing phenomena by observation”,
this should not be taken literally (Bohr 1948, 315; Bohr 1949, 237). So the
“quantum postulate” should not be understood as the statement that energy
8Howard (2005) presents a detailed and illuminating survey of the physical develop-
ments that drove Bohr to his “wholeness” conclusion, and also discusses how Einstein
dealt with these same developments. As Howard makes clear, it is in the early period of
the history of quantum theory—1905–1927—that we can identify the roots both of Bohr’s
complementarity, and of Einstein’s later resistance to quantum mechanics on the grounds
that it does not satisfy a principle of separability. It is sometimes claimed that Bohr only
came to embrace “holism” after the 1935 EPR discussion, but this is in conflict with the
textual evidence. The doctrine already occurs in the 1927 Como lecture.
9By “agencies of observation” Bohr just means “measuring devices”. Bohr never assigns
a special role to human agency, apart from the capacity of human observers to decide to
build one measuring apparatus rather than another.
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is exchanged in discrete packets, and that there is a random disturbance of
prior existing properties by this exchange, but rather as a metaphorical
expression of the fact that objects entering into an interaction come to form
one whole (“as symbolised by the finite value of h”, as Bohr often puts it).
Bohr’s terminology certainly is apt to confuse here, because it makes
use of expressions that already possessed a meaning but now acquire a new,
metaphorical sense within the new conceptual framework. Bohr’s global
approach and way of arguing are very characteristic here: he comes to the
subject as a physicist, adapting his intuitions on the basis of new empirical
facts, and wrestles to make these new intuitions clear by couching them in
familiar terms. This is completely different from the attitude of a philoso-
pher starting from a desire to hygienically regiment language.
In Bohr’s reply to EPR we again read:
Indeed the finite interaction between object and measuring agen-
cies conditioned by the very existence of the quantum of action
entails—because of the impossibility of controlling the reaction
of the object on the measuring instruments if these are to serve
their purpose—the necessity of a final renunciation of the clas-
sical ideal of causality and a radical revision of our attitude to-
wards the problem of physical reality (Bohr 1935, 697).
No wonder that this passage has lead to misunderstandings, as it appears to
deal explicitly with discrete interactions and disturbances. However, such
a “common-sense reading” would make it completely mysterious why these
finite interactions would “entail the necessity of a final renunciation of the
classical ideal of causality and a radical revision towards the problem of
physical reality”—a theme already familiar from the Como lecture. The
mystery is solved when a little bit further on the same page we find: “The
impossibility of a closer analysis of the reactions between the particle and the
measuring instrument .... is an essential property of any arrangement suited
to the study of the phenomena of the type concerned, where we have to do
with a feature of individuality completely foreign to classical physics.” This
brings us back to wholeness and individuality (in the sense of indivisibility
and “the impossibility of a closer analysis”), which is clearly what Bohr
has in mind even when he uses expressions like “finite interactions between
object and measuring device”.
Note how easily Bohr switches, in the just-given pair of quotes, from
“the impossibility of controlling the reaction of the object on the measur-
ing instruments” to “the impossibility of a closer analysis of the reactions
between the particle and the measuring instrument.” The first expression,
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when taken literally, does not indicate at all that a drastic revision of classi-
cal concepts is necessary: the impossibility of controlling an interaction does
not imply anything about the status of the various parties in the interaction.
However, the impossibility of any further theoretical analysis may very well
have such conceptual consequences. For Bohr, however, there seems to be
no significant difference between the two expressions, which reinforces our
earlier diagnosis: Bohr speaks as a physicist, using intuitive common sense
language, without being too anxious about conceptual hairsplitting.
There can be no doubt that the metaphorical reading of “uncontrollable
disturbance” is the correct one. It makes sense in all of Bohr’s publications
on the interpretation of quantum mechanics and, moreover, it plays a pivotal
role in grounding the doctrine of “complementarity”. For example, in the
Einstein volume Bohr reviews once again experiments that illustrate the
necessary “renunciation of the visualization of atomic phenomena imposed
on us by the impossibility of their subdivision” (emphasis added), and draws
the conclusion that “arguments of this kind which recall the impossibility
of subdividing quantum phenomena ... reveal the ambiguity in ascribing
customary physical attributes to atomic objects” (Bohr 1949, 222). He then
goes on to point out that an unambiguous use of space-time concepts is only
possible when classical concepts become applicable to one of the parties in
the interaction, for example when marks have formed on a photographic
plate in a practically irreversible amplification process. This then forges
a connection to the doctrine of classical concepts and leads to the famous
principle that definite properties can only be ascribed to atomic objects in
a classically describable measurement context.
In his reply to EPR Bohr emphasizes that the ambiguity in ascribing
physical properties to atomic systems is not a matter of insufficient knowl-
edge. Rather, “we have not merely to do with an ignorance of the value
of certain physical quantities, but with the impossibility of defining these
quantities in an unambiguous way” (Bohr 1935, 699)—emphasis added. This
lack of definiteness is in principle also there in the case of the description
of the measuring device itself: it is subject to the uncertainty relations as
well, as we shall further discuss below. But when macroscopic devices are
at stake the smallness of the “latitudes” comes to the rescue (as we have
seen in section 3): this makes them negligible and allows “a purely classi-
cal account of the measuring apparatus” (Bohr 1935, 698). So in the case
of these measuring devices and other macroscopic objects it is consistent
that we make epistemic contact with quantum reality by means of ordinary
perception and classical concepts. Measuring devices can be described by
means of values of classical quantities and by extension the measured atomic
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system, whose properties are correlated with the properties of the measuring
device (pointer positions, dark spots on a photographic plate, and so on)
becomes unambiguously describable as well.
We thus have returned to the theme of the indispensability of classical
concepts of the previous section: measuring devices, like all macroscopic
objects around us, can and must be described classically. It is an immedi-
ate consequence of this that measurements necessarily have only one single
outcome. Pointers can only have one position at a time, a light flashes or
does not flash, and so on—this is all inherent in the uniqueness of the clas-
sical description. Because of this, Bohr’s interpretation does not face the
“measurement problem” in the form in which it is often posed in the foun-
dational literature, namely as the problem of how to explain—in the face of
the presence of superpositions in the mathematical formalism—that there is
only one outcome realized each time we run an experiment. For Bohr this is
not something to be explained, but rather something that is given and has
to be assumed to start with. It is a primitive datum, in the same sense that
the applicability of classical language to our everyday world (see section 3)
is a brute fact to which the interpretation of quantum mechanics necessarily
has to conform. An interpretation that would predict that pointers can have
more than one position, that a cat can be both dead and alive, etc., would
be a non-starter from Bohr’s point of view. So the measurement problem
in its usual form does not exist; it is dissolved. This does not mean that we
cannot or should not inquire how this “uniqueness of the classically describ-
able world” fits in with the formalism of quantum theory, of course. We
shall consider this question of the relation with the formalism in the next
section.
For now, we want to return to another central point in Bohr’s interpre-
tation, namely the issue of how the classical description of the measuring
device relates to complementarity, i.e. the doctrine that concepts like “posi-
tion” and “momentum” cannot be applicable at the same time. If measuring
devices were purely classical, so that the classical description applied in all
exactness, there would be no reason to assume that there is an incompat-
ibility between certain concepts: it is a hallmark of classicality that all
physical quantities are well-defined and possess sharp values simultaneously
(in mathematical terms: that the quantities form a Boolean algebra). If
this were strictly true of the measuring device, there would be no problem
of principle in attributing sharp values also to all quantities of correlated
micro systems.
We have already seen in section 3 that Bohr denied that the classical de-
scriptions on the macro level have a fundamental ontological import; macro
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systems are basically quantum mechanical. Still, in a famous part of his re-
port about his discussions with Einstein, Bohr may appear to suggest that a
completely classical account of measuring devices suffices to explain that it
is impossible to assign both position and momentum to the measured quan-
tum systems, as the experimental set-up needed to measure one of these
quantities is incompatible with the set-up necessary to measure the other
(Bohr 1949, 219–223). Thus, in order to measure position, one needs to fix
all relative positions in the device by means of rigid connections, and the
whole assembly should be bolted firmly to a common support. As Bohr
comments, “in such an arrangement ... it is obviously impossible to control
the momentum exchanged between the particle and the separate parts of
the apparatus.” By contrast, if we want to experimentally study momen-
tum exchange, “certain parts of the whole device must naturally be given
the freedom to move independently of others.” These statements (famously
illustrated by drawings that plastically exhibit the mutual exclusiveness of
motion and stationarity) might create the impression that Bohr is contend-
ing that even on purely classical grounds one cannot simultaneously fix both
momentum and position of a micro object. But this interpretation would
be mistaken.
If the classical description applied with full precision, even the momen-
tum absorbed by a device firmly bolted to the ground (in a laboratory on
Earth) would be well-defined and could in principle be determined. Cer-
tainly, one would need a measuring procedure of fantastic accuracy for this
purpose—but this is only a practical objection. By the same token, even
the fastest moving classical object possesses at all times a well-defined posi-
tion. Bohr is perfectly aware of this and leaves no doubt, in the passages in
question, that it is only the basic quantum nature of the measuring devices
that is responsible for complementarity.
For the case of a moving diaphragm with a slit in it, this means that
“there will always be, in conformity with the indeterminacy principle, a
reciprocal relationship between our knowledge of the position of the slit
and the accuracy of the momentum control” (Bohr 1949, 220).10 Similarly,
the impossibility of momentum control in the case of a stationary device
is not a consequence of its classical stationarity, but is due to its quantum
character. A very small latitude in position implies a very large quantum
10Bohr’s use of the expressions “knowledge of the position of the slit” and “accuracy of
the momentum control” may suggest that there are in fact precise positions and momenta,
although we do not know them; but this is not what he intends, as we have seen before
and as he explains on p. 237 of the same text. It is the unsharpness of definition and the
corresponding “latitude” that are decisive here.
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latitude (indeterminacy, “uncertainty”) in momentum and it is only this
that makes it impossible to control the exchanged momentum. The bolting
to the ground (which is equivalent to giving the device a huge mass) only
serves to guarantee that the latitude in velocity associated with the large
latitude in momentum can be completely neglected, so that we have a truly
stationary device, as described in classical terms.
In other words, the doctrine of complementarity in its relation to mea-
surement contexts only makes sense if it is acknowledged that measuring
devices, like macroscopic objects in general, are in principle subject to quan-
tum mechanics, even if it is true that we need classical concepts to have epis-
temological access to them. This reiterates our earlier point that the use
of common language, extended by classical physics, is an epistemological
manoeuvre that does not imply any ontic divide.
That the structure of the quantum formalism, in spite of its “symbolic
character”, was a decisive factor in the formation of Bohr’s thoughts about
complementarity is something we have already seen in section 2. In the
Como lecture Bohr used the superposition principle and de Broglie wave
packets to argue for the uncertainty relations, conceived as limitations on
sharp definition, and based complementarity on this. In his reply to Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen, in the Einstein volume, and in his Dialectica article
Bohr explicitly applies the uncertainty relations to macroscopic objects in
order to justify complementarity. As he puts it in the EPR paper:
in the phenomena concerned we are not dealing with an incom-
plete description characterized by the arbitrary picking out of
different elements of physical reality at the cost of sacrificing
other such elements, but with a rational discrimination between
essentially different experimental arrangements and procedures
which are suited either for an unambiguous use of the idea of
space location, or for a legitimate application of the conserva-
tion theorem of momentum. ... In fact, the renunciation in
each experimental arrangement of the one or the other of two
aspects of the description of physical phenomena,—the combi-
nation of which characterizes the method of classical physics, and
which therefore in this sense may be considered as complemen-
tary to each other,—depends essentially on the impossibility, in
the field of quantum theory, of accurately controlling the reac-
tion of the object on the measuring instruments, i.e., the trans-
fer of momentum in the case of position measurements, and the
displacement in case of momentum measurements. Just in this
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last respect any comparison between quantum mechanics and
statistical mechanics,—however useful it may be for the formal
representation of the theory,—is essentially irrelevant. Indeed
we have in each experimental arrangement suited for the study
of proper quantum phenomena not merely to do with an igno-
rance of the value of certain physical quantities, but with the
impossibility of defining these quantities in an unambiguous way
(Bohr 1935, 699).
This may not be the most transparent and elegant way to explain the situa-
tion, but still, all the important elements are here. Whether a given set-up
is appropriate for fixing position or momentum of a micro object is not a
choice up to us, but is decided by whether the instantiated quantum proper-
ties are either close enough to classical position or to momentum. According
to quantum theory, these two possibilities are mutually exclusive. This is
not due to some epistemic conundrum, but mirrors a feature of quantum re-
ality: position and momentum cannot be sharply defined at the same time,
not even for macro objects.
As we have seen in the beginning of this section, the “uncontrollable
disturbance” and “individuality” that Bohr frequently mentions as being a
necessary part of any interaction, in particular a measurement, are meant to
refer to the holistic nature of the combined interacting system. Accordingly,
Bohr says, in a measurement the “micro part” does not possess its own
independent state. So the situation is not like the one in classical mechanics
in which a particle can always—whether in a measurement situation or not—
be characterized by its position and momentum values. This means that
we can only attribute position or momentum to the micro system relative
to the actual measurement context in which it finds itself. This then is
the essential ingredient of the complementarity doctrine: a micro system,
for example an electron, can only be assigned a position or a momentum
relative to a concrete context.
Given that even macroscopic objects—like measuring devices—are basi-
cally quantum mechanical, consistency requires that their properties should
in principle be contextual as well. That implies that also their properties
depend on the measurement context. Bohr does not discuss this in depth:
he only remarks, as we have seen, that if objects are sufficiently big and
heavy quantum effects can be neglected for all practical purposes; and that
we should only consider the remaining very small latitudes in their classical
properties if consistency requirements force us to treat macroscopic objects
as explicitly quantum mechanical. As we shall see, more can be said about
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this and similar issues if we take account of the quantum formalism in a
more detailed way than we have done, in the footsteps of Bohr, so far.
5 Bohr’s interpretation and the formalism
We can conclude from our discussion up to now that the formal structure
of quantum mechanics played a role in Bohr’s interpretation that is more
important than standard stories tell us. True, Bohr saw the formalism as
“symbolic”; by this he meant that a visualizable classical interpretation was
not possible. But he did not at all think that the formalism should be
considered a mathematical calculus without physical content. Quite the op-
posite: the structure of the formalism gave Bohr the essential motivation
for his doctrine of complementarity, via the uncertainty relations and the
canonical commutation relations. Complementarity entails an account of
what the physical world is like: it implies a “relativization” of the applica-
bility of classical concepts to the quantum world and thus tells us how the
physical structure of the micro world should be characterized. Moreover,
the interpretation of the mathematically defined uncertainties as “indeter-
minacies in definition”, “latitudes”, in classical quantities made it possible
for Bohr to combine the epistemologically unavoidable classical descriptions
of macroscopic objects in the everyday world around us with their inherent
quantum character.
It remains true that Bohr appealed only to general features of the quan-
tum formalism: all he used was some Fourier analysis of wave packets, the
operator form of p and q and the canonical commutation relations, the super-
position principle for waves, and a number of qualitative statements about
the role of macroscopic masses and irreversibility in going to the classical
limit. In addition, Bohr commented on the importance of the fact that
wave functions of many-particles systems are defined in high-dimensional
n-particles configuration spaces, and that these wave functions cannot be
reduced to n three-dimensional waves. As we have seen, the latter is due to
the validity of the superposition principle in the configuration space, which
in general makes the total wave function non-factorizable. In present-day
parlance, the n-particles wave function generally is an entangled state. It is
now recognized that entanglement is one of the most characteristic features
of quantum mechanics—if not the most characteristic feature, as famously
suggested by Schro¨dinger (1935). Although Bohr in effect referred to entan-
glement as his most important ground for thinking that the formalism has a
non-pictorial content, he did not go into further details and did not explic-
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itly single out entanglement (or an equivalent notion) as a key mathematical
feature of the formalism.
He did, however, single out the “individuality” and wholeness occurring
in quantum interaction processes as an essential and revolutionary trait of
the new theory. From a modern point of view this wholeness, according
to which systems do not keep their own wave functions during an interac-
tion, is a direct consequence of entanglement. When two systems—each in
their own quantum state—start to interact, the Schro¨dinger equation (more
generally: any unitary evolution equation) dictates that an entangled two-
particles state is formed in which the component systems can only be de-
scribed by “mixtures” (obtained by “partial tracing”) instead of pure states
(wave functions). So one is tempted to relate Bohr’s emphasis on the vital
importance of “individuality” in the interpretation of quantum mechanics to
the pivotal role of entanglement in modern more formal considerations. In
particular, when Bohr speaks about the inextricable whole formed by mea-
suring device and quantum system (vital for complementarity), this seems
translatable into statements about the combined entangled state of device
and object system that results from the interaction between them.11 So one
could argue, as Howard suggests, that Bohr was familiar with entanglement
and recognized its importance in the formalism (Howard 1994, 2004, 2005).
There can be no doubt that Bohr indeed knew about consequences of
entanglement, for example from his discussion with Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen, and had even seen its formal representation in von Neumann’s the-
ory of measurement (von Neumann 1932). Still, it seems less than certain
that he actually thought about his “individuality” along lines suggested by
the formal treatment of entangled states a` la von Neumann. Bohr’s way
11This assumes that Bohr did not suppose that there exists a special form of interaction,
resulting in a “collapse of the wave function”, manifesting itself only in measurements (as
opposed to ordinary physical interactions). This non-collapse assumption is eminently
plausible, given that Bohr always speaks about interactions between measuring devices
and objects in ordinary physical terms, such as “uncontrollable disturbance”, “discrete
exchange of energy and momentum”, leading to the typical “individuality of the phe-
nomenon”. Moreover, as we have seen, Bohr in many places stresses the universality of
quantum theory, which is hardly compatible with a special role for macroscopic measuring
instruments as far as physical evolution is concerned. Finally, Bohr never mentions “col-
lapses” in his published writings. Nevertheless, it has been part of the folklore surrounding
the “Copenhagen interpretation” to maintain that Bohr’s views are characterized precisely
by such “collapses”—this is now generally rejected by Bohr scholars (Howard 2004; Faye
2014). Zinkernagel (2016) has recently drawn attention to a number of unpublished letters
in which Bohr mentions the updating of our knowledge when measurement results become
available, which seems similar to collapses. But this updating of information can easily
be given an epistemic interpretation.
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of speaking about “individuality” and wholeness always kept a flavor of
the old quantum theory, appealing as it did to an interaction that cannot
be analyzed and therefore blurs the distinction between the partners in the
interaction. It is true that Bohr came to use this terminology in a metaphor-
ical way, but he never made a transition to an explicit discussion of formal
aspects of entanglement in this context. We must of course realize that no-
body did so at the time, so the question of whether Bohr was really aware
of the significance of entanglement may be too anachronistic to deserve a
debate.
However this may be, I think it is safe to say that Bohr’s “individuality”
actually corresponds to entanglement in the formalism, and that by using
this we may translate—or “reconstruct”, as Howard (1994) says—Bohr’s
statements in formal terms, regardless of whether Bohr himself was thinking
in terms of this precise formal correspondence.
With the help of this translation of “individuality” into “entanglement” a
formal picture of Bohr’s account of quantum mechanics can be constructed.
To start, let us translate into mathematical terms Bohr’s claim that two in-
teracting quantum systems generally lose their own states and become part
of one “individual” whole. In the Hilbert space formalism this is appropri-
ately captured by the standard von Neumann form of a unitary interaction:
|S10〉 ⊗ |S20〉 −→
∑
i
ci|S1i 〉 ⊗ |S2i 〉, (1)
in which |S10〉 and |S20〉 are the initial states of system 1 and system 2,
respectively, and in which the arrow represents the unitary evolution that
results from the interaction. The right-hand side of Eq. (1) is an entangled
state, which for convenience has here been written in its Schmidt form (so
that the states |S1i 〉, and also |S2i 〉, are mutually orthogonal for values of i
that differ from each other). In this entangled state no single (pure) state
can be assigned to either system 1 or system 2; the best one can do is to
extract, by “partial tracing”, a density operator for each of the two systems:∑
i |ci|2|Si〉〈Si| (for ease of notation the index 1 or 2 has been suppressed).
This then is the mathematical Hilbert space translation of Bohr’s state-
ment that the separate systems do not possess their own wave functions
when interactions are going on; and of the claim that the whole system
displays an “individuality” typical of quantum mechanics—“individuality”
being represented by entanglement.
The interesting special case of course is the one in which we are deal-
ing with a measurement, in the sense of an interaction between a quantum
system and a macroscopic system in which an irreversible recording of an
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outcome takes place. As we have seen, this is the situation used by Bohr
to inject physical content into the formalism: macroscopic devices can be
characterized by sharp values of position, momentum and other classical
quantities and this characterization gives us epistemic access to the quan-
tum world. In order to formalize this thought, we have to look for represen-
tations of interactions in which at least one of the systems can be described
classically; that is, it should be represented in the formalism with quantum
“latitudes” that are so small that the attribution of sharp classical values
becomes possible without practical contradictions.
Bohr himself gives us the hint that we should think of big and heavy
systems that are able to amplify micro differences in an irreversible way,
so that well-defined measurement results arise. This accords well with he
present-day consensus that decoherence processes are vital for understanding
the classical limit of quantum mechanics. The core principle of decoherence
is that systems which are sufficiently big will in ordinary circumstances be
in continuous interaction with their environment, and that this interaction
will wash out the quantum aspects of the behavior of the system. Typi-
cal interactions in our macroscopic environment (primarily electromagnetic
interactions) are sensitive to the positions of the interacting objects and
this has the consequence that macro objects, through the irreversible “de-
cohering” interaction with their environment, will lose quantum coherence
between different positions—which in turn means that they will behave as
if they possessed a definite position at each moment. More precisely, mea-
surement interactions involving classically describable devices have a form
like:
|S0〉 ⊗ |M0〉 ⊗ |E0〉 −→
∑
i
ci|Si〉 ⊗ |Mi〉 ⊗ |Ei〉, (2)
where S denotes the micro system on which a measurement is being made,
M is the macroscopic measuring device, and E stands for the decohering en-
vironment that is in continual interaction with the device. The idea is that
because of the interaction with the environment, the |Mi〉 Hilbert space
states will be (practically) mutually orthogonal and entangled with orthog-
onal environment states |Ei〉—this is the decoherence effect that washes out
interference between different values of i. Furthermore, the states |Mi〉 will
be characterized by macroscopic pointer position values with a very small
indeterminacy (i.e., 〈Mi|(X − X)2|Mi〉 vanishingly small in comparison to
X, with X the relevant position operator and X its expectation value). The
irreversible interaction between the measuring device and the environment
E keeps these practically classical position values intact, in the sense that
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sharp values will not be blurred over time. Finally, the interaction between
S and M should represent a measurement of some observable, for example
momentum p. That means that different positions of the almost-classical
pointer (on the dial of the device) should become correlated, by the inter-
action, to different momentum states of the system S (so that the Hilbert
space states |Si〉 of Eq. (2) in this case should be momentum eigenstates).
This account is only a rough sketch of how macroscopic measurements
are modeled, with the help of decoherence, in present-day quantum mechan-
ics; Rosaler (2016) gives a more detailed account. The essential point is that
classical structures can be identified in the formal quantum representation,
in the sense that device states with almost classical properties naturally oc-
cur (i.e. states with practically sharp values of position together with practi-
cally sharp values of velocity, obeying classical equations of motion with high
precision). This then is the point where the formalism allows contact with
Bohr’s epistemological demand that we must describe the world around us in
classical terms. So the (almost-classical) state |Mi〉 of the measuring device
represents the situation that we describe in classical terms with a pointer
position “i”, and we assign the correlated value of the measured quantity
to the micro system S. On the micro level the indeterminacies (latitudes)
can of course not be neglected, and the quantum formalism automatically
fulfils the requirements of complementarity in the form of the uncertainty
relations for canonically conjugated quantities. So quantities like position
and momentum can never be assigned sharp values together. The nature of
the measuring device and its interaction with the system, finally resulting
in a state of the form of the right-hand side of Eq. 2, fixes which properties
can be assigned to the object (namely those that are definite-valued in the
states |Si〉).
We have glossed over an important point however. In Eq. 2, as in all
equations representing final states after unitary interactions, we do not have
one state of the measuring device, but all these states |Mi〉 figure together
in the superposition at the right-hand side of the arrow. So in the Bohrian
interpretation of the formalism that we just explained we seem to have com-
mitted the error of replacing the full superposition by just one term in it.
In fact, this is the standard objection against claims that decoherence solves
the measurement problem. In the quantum formalism with only unitary
evolution (so no collapses) we always end up with superpositions after inter-
actions, also in the case of decoherence (as can be verified by looking at Eq.
2). But this means, so the objection goes, that the measurement problem,
in the form of the question why there is only one outcome, has not been
solved—and even cannot be solved.
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However, this objection misconstrues Bohr’s approach to the interpreta-
tional problem, as we have already explained in section 4. Although Bohr
takes the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics seriously, as pro-
viding us with information about the micro world, he does not start from
the formalism in his interpretation. The formalism can only tell us about
properties of micro systems once it has made contact with physical reality,
and this contact can only be established via identifications between symbols
and physical quantities on the macro level, described in classical language.
The starting point for attributing physical meaning is thus the classical de-
scription of laboratory practice—and here experiments certainly have only
one result at a time. So the uniqueness of experimental outcomes is not
something to be explained, but is something accepted from the outset. The
task is to find suitable expressions in the formalism that can represent these
unique outcomes, and in this way to endow the mathematics with physical
content.
In other words, the mistake made in the objection is the supposition
that the mathematical framework, with its superpositions, already possesses
physical meaning before the empirical interpretation has even started, and
that the occurrence of superpositions of states |Mi〉 must signal the joint
physical presence of all results i. In the Bohrian approach that we are
outlining this is putting the cart before the horse. The measurement problem
in its usual form, coming from the urge to explain how superpositions can
fail to correspond to multiple outcomes, does not exist for Bohr.
In order to make this Bohrian approach correspond to the mathematical
formalism, we need the following interpretational move: in measurement
situations in which the final formal state is of the form
∑
i ci|Si〉⊗|Mi〉⊗|Ei〉,
as in Eq. 2, the corresponding physical situation is that the pointer of the
device points to one of the possible pointer positions i; the probability that
a specific i instead of one of the alternative values is realized is given by
|ci|2.
This interpretational manoeuvre is not only Bohrian, but in accordance
with a wide class of non-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. In
particular, modal interpretations employ an explicit interpretational rule of
precisely this kind (Lombardi and Dieks 2014; Bub 1997; Dieks 1989a,b);
but the many-histories interpretation and the Everett interpretation are
also compatible with the idea that our observable world corresponds to one
branch from the superposition, selected by decoherence (Rosaler 2016). We
shall briefly return to this connection with non-collapse interpretations in
the next section.
The proposal to interpret the superposition in terms of one single out-
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come bears similarity to Howard’s “reconstruction” of Bohr (Howard 1994).
Howard reads Bohr as saying that the description of the measuring device
by the superposition of Eq. 2 can be replaced by one of the components in
the density operator of M . According to Howard, Bohr proposes that we act
“as if” the right-hand side of (2) were |Si〉 ⊗ |Mi〉 ⊗ |Ei〉. But it is mislead-
ing to introduce such an “as if”. It suggests that the full superposition by
itself cannot have the desired meaning, and that Bohr therefore had to have
recourse to a sleight of hand. But as we have just argued, the superposition
does not have an empirical meaning independently of its interpretation via
classically described experiments, so no replacement by another mathemat-
ical state is needed. We just have to interpret the formulas correctly.
One might get the impression that the interpretation of entangled states
of object system plus a measuring device in terms of just one measurement
result is a verbal move that is equivalent to accepting the projection pos-
tulate. If this were right, the interpretation would bring in the projection
postulate via the back door, and would effectively violate what we have
accepted as one of Bohr’s principles, namely that projection or collapse
should not be seen as a dynamical evolution process, but rather as a way of
efficient bookkeeping that takes into account available information about ex-
perimental outcomes. However, there is an important difference between the
interpretational principle outlined above and the projection postulate. The
projection postulate tells us that the quantum mechanical state, as defined
in the mathematical formalism, changes in a measurement from an entangled
state to a product state, namely one of the terms occurring in the original
entangled superposition. This is a non-unitary evolution that is impossible
in non-collapse interpretations. In principle, this difference in the sorts of
interaction that occur in the formalism can lead to a difference in empirical
predictions. The reason is that if we do not have collapses, superpositions
will always maintain themselves, and this entails the possibility in principle
of interference between the “branches” defined by the individual product
states; whereas in the case of collapses no other branches are left with which
interference can take place. It is true that this possibility of interference
is remote in the circumstances of ordinary experiments, and Bohr probably
never considered such exotic consequences of quantum theory. Moreover,
his emphasis on the irreversibility of measurements, which is vindicated by
the modern decoherence program, effectively blocks the possibility of a re-
combination of branches in ordinary experimental practice. Nevertheless,
experimental techniques have advanced enormously since Bohr’s days, and
it is not excluded that effects of unitarity will become accessible to empirical
tests.
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Given that modern experimental techniques have created possibilities
that were unheard of in Bohr’s days, there may also be ways to investigate
other (though related) possible effects of unitarity on the macroscopic level.
Think of a hermetically closed chamber, in which a quantum measurement
takes place. According to the interpretation of entangled states that we have
outlined, a macroscopic device inside the chamber will register one unique
result, even though according to the unitary theory the state of quantum
system plus device is a superposition. However, an external observer who
performs measurements on this room from the outside may be able to find
results that indicate that the formal description of the chamber with its
contents by the superposition is the right one (Bene and Dieks 2002; Dieks
2016).
The scenario reminds one of the predicament of Schro¨dinger’s famous
cat, which is shut up in a sealed room together with a decaying atom that
is able to activate an infernal machine. After some time, the macroscopic
cat system plus its microscopic environment will be formally described by
an entangled superposed state. According to the Bohrian interpretation
of the formalism as we have discussed it here, the cat is either dead or
alive after the experiment. However, an external observer who performs
measurements on the closed room, and thus has no direct access to the
cat, can in principle find out that the superposed formal “dead plus alive
state” is correct. For example, this superposed state may be an eigenstate
of the observable measured by the external observer, and this can be borne
out by the results of experiments. Experiments with such “Schro¨dinger-
cat states” have actually been performed during the last two decades. The
results show that an external observer can indeed observe the existence of
the superposition,and thus verify that no collapse has taken place.
We thus see that the relational character of Bohr’s interpretation must
even go further than he himself emphasized, if we take its strict relation to
the mathematical formalism seriously. Bohr stressed that the physical state
of a system (in terms of the physical properties that can be attributed to
it) only becomes definite in a well-defined experimental context. Thus, an
electron can be assigned a position in the context of a position measurement,
or a momentum value in the context of a measurement of momentum; and
these two property assignments never apply simultaneously. But now an
additional relational aspect reveals itself: for an observer inside the room
with the cat (in the Schro¨dinger experiment) the cat is either dead or alive,
but for an outside observer this need not be the case. So properties not only
need “defining circumstances” to make them definite, but can also vary from
one observer to another in (admittedly far from common!) circumstances of
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the kind we just described (Bene and Dieks 2002; Dieks 2016).
Even in such very strange situations, classical terminology remains appli-
cable, in accordance with Bohr’s claim. Thus, the internal observer describes
the cat as either dead or alive, and the external observer establishes that the
pointer of his measuring instrument, with which he performs his measure-
ment on the sealed room, adopts a definite position that indicates the result.
But the prediction and explanation of these measurement results cannot be
given along classical lines; it needs the full (non-collapse) formalism of quan-
tum mechanics. This illustrates Bohr’s earlier-quoted dictum that “however
far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the
account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms” (Bohr 1949,
209).
6 Conclusion
Although Bohr qualified the mathematical formalism of quantum theory as
symbolic, he took it more seriously than usually acknowledged. He realized
that physical meaning has to be injected into the formalism in order to
make it a physical theory, and took the pragmatically and epistemologically
well-justified position that this can only be done via contact with our world
of experience, which we describe in common language enriched with terms
from classical physics. However, the form of the formalism itself stands
in the way of implementing a full classical interpretation across the board,
extending to the micro domain. Classical pictures of micro systems are
therefore impossible, according to Bohr, and this is responsible for the fact
that the formalism is symbolic even after empirical interpretation, namely in
the sense that it does not support a vizualizable representation of the micro
world—at least not in the sense of the pictures we normally associate with
physical systems. This does not mean that according to Bohr we should opt
for instrumentalism and forswear talk about electrons, photons and atoms.
Such quantum systems do exist, but their mode of being cannot be captured
by describing them with independent properties and states. This is all made
more precise by the doctrine of complementarity, as we have seen in sections
2, 3 and 4. Significantly, structural features of the quantum formalism
(superposition of waves, the canonical commutation relations) inspired Bohr
decisively in this doctrine.
There can be little doubt that Bohr saw quantum mechanics as a univer-
sal theory, with an unrestricted domain of validity. It is also highly plausible
that he did not think of the collapse of the wave function as a physical pro-
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cess, as a rival in the formalism of unitary Scho¨dinger time evolution. From
a modern perspective, this places Bohr in the camp of non-collapse inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics (section 5).
The latter observation raises the (partly historical) question of why Bohr
did not embrace attempts to formulate formally precise versions of non-
collapse interpretations, in particular why he remained hostile to the “rel-
ative state” interpretation proposed by Everett in his dissertation (Everett
1957). Significantly, Everett’s supervisor Wheeler was convinced that Ev-
erett’s work could be seen as a formal elaboration of Bohr’s interpretation
and started a correspondence about the subject with the Copenhagen group;
Everett even visited Bohr on Wheeler’s instigation in 1959 (after two earlier
aborted plans to visit). But Everett’s work was not received favorably.12
From the evidence adduced by Osnaghi, Freitas and Freire (2009) it
seems clear that Bohr’s main objection was that it remained completely un-
solved how Everett’s scheme made contact with physical reality. Everett’s
universal wave function struck the Copenhagenists as a purely formal piece
of mathematics, because it did not explicitly relate to an experimental con-
text which can be described in classical terms. So the spot where the shoe
pinched was in the epistemological part of Bohr’s interpretation, the doc-
trine of the inevitability of the use of classical concepts (section 3). Indeed,
both Everett and Wheeler relativized the inevitability of classical concepts
and thought of the quantum formalism as a more general picture of quantum
reality (although Wheeler later retraced his steps). This appears to highlight
a significant difference between Everett and Bohr: although Bohr was not
an instrumentalist, his views were firmly bound up with the experimental
practice of physics, and he took the concepts that derive from this prac-
tice as primordial. Accordingly, any consideration of the formalism and its
meaning should be preceded by the specification of physical concepts that
ultimately derive from the description of macroscopic experimental situa-
tions. This need not be regarded as a Kantian move: it is first and foremost
12This historical episode is described in an informative article by Osnaghi, Freitas and
Freire (2009). This article contains a detailed account of the correspondence between
Wheeler and various members of the Copenhagen group, which makes it clear that Bohr
himself did not seriously study Everett’s work and left it to his collaborators to respond.
They did so in ways that were not always consistent with each other, nor with Bohr’s own
general views. Part of Bohr’s lack of interest may have been due to Everett’s unforth-
coming attitude with respect to “Copenhagen”—which was repaid in kind. However this
may be, a basic theme can be distilled from the few remarks by Bohr himself that have
been passed down and from the diverse arguments coming from Bohr’s collaborators. This
theme is well described by Osnaghi, Freitas and Freire (2009), even though these authors
place their findings against the mistaken backdrop of Bohr’s supposed instrumentalism.
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a pragmatic physicist’s attitude that serves to safeguard the direct link to
concrete physical experience. By contrast, Everett’s attitude was completely
abstract. Everett did not delve into the epistemological problem of how the
mathematical symbols receive their physical meaning and did not analyze
physical practice. It is no wonder then that the Copenhagen camp con-
sidered Everett as someone who had dabbled at an abstract mathematical
structure and naively took it for a picture of the world, without asking him-
self what the picture-reality relation consisted in. For them, he was someone
who had not even understood what the interpretational question was about.
This intermezzo further clarifies Bohr’s attitude with respect to the quan-
tum formalism. He certainly took the formalism seriously, was not an in-
strumentalist and was guided by the mathematical structure of the formal-
ism when he developed his interpretation. But physical concepts, which he
took to be indispensable for providing meaning to the formalism, always
remained the most important ingredient in his analyses. It remains to be
seen, however, whether from a present-day point of view Bohr’s objections
to Everett provide weighty arguments against an interpretation of Bohr’s
interpretation as a non-collapse interpretation in the modern sense. As far
as I can see, Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts may very well be incorpo-
rated in formal non-collapse schemes, even if these make use of the notion of
a universal wave function. This, however, is better kept for another study.
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